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SAYING "NO" TO WAR IN THE TECHNOLOGICAL AGE
-CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION AND THE WORLD
PEACE TAX FUND ACT t
Charles R. DiSalvo*
In 313 A.D., a dramatic change took place in the Roman world: Con-
stantine became the first Christian to rule the Roman empire. With the
ascension of this warrior to the Emperor's throne, the early Church's
centuries-old fidelity to pacifism came to a sudden end. Christianity and
militarism, once polar opposites, became handmaidens of the new state.'
Since the time of Constantine, governments have viewed pacifists as a
minority to be enslaved in work camps, inducted forcibly into armed ser-
vice, employed in menial alternative jobs, or simply ignored. The survival
of pacificism evidences the movement's dedication to the idea of a witness
to peace. One form that witness has taken, and continues to take, is
religious resistance to war taxation. Because religious resisters posit that war
is an absolute evil, they believe that helping to finance war is an evil itself.
Although religious tax resistance in this country has placed its mark on vir-
tually every period of American history, religious pacifists view tax
resistance as more important today because of the increasingly technological
character of war. Masses of infantrymen are now no longer necessary to
launch and wage wars; they have been replaced by a few men capable of
deploying thousands of costly, sophisticated nuclear missiles. Technology
now supersedes the foot soldier in importance; the conscription of dollars
precedes the conscription of persons.
Accordingly, religious objectors feel compelled to resist war both by
withholding their tax dollars and their bodies. In the words of one pacifist
poet, their "corLsciences are in His keeping and no other." 2 To honor their
t Copyright © Charles R. DiSalvo, 1982.
* Associate Professor of Law, West Virginia University College of Law; B.A., St. John
Fisher College, 1971); M.A., Claremont Graduate School, 1971; J.D., University of Southern
California Law Center, 1974.
The author thanks Robert M. Bastress, Jr., Harrop Freeman, James B. Haines, and
Kathleen M. Kennedy for their thoughtful comments on earlier drafts of this Article.
1. See R. BAINTON, CHRISTIAN ATTITUDES TOWARD WAR AND PEACE 85 (1960). But see
Letter from Prof. Joseph Fahey, Ph.D., Director, Peace Studies Institute, Manhattan College,
to the author (Jan. 12, 1982). Prof. Fahey indicated that, according to legend, Constantine was
not baptized until he was on his deathbed. Fahey also believes that pacifism did not cease to be
a mainstream witne:is of the early Christians until the late fourth century with "the acceptance
of SS. Ambrose and Augustine of the Just War principles which had earlier been developed by
Plato, Cicero and others." Id.
2. D. Berrigan, (excerpt from an unpublished poem adapting prose originally found in
NIGHT FLIGHT TO HANOI at xvi (1969)). Berrigan, noting the moral motivation of objectors,
stated: "In a time of death, some men-they proclaim their love of the brethren." D. BER-
RIGAN, NIGHT FLIGIT TO HANOI at xix (1969) [hereinafter cited as NIGHT FLIGHT].
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consciences on this matter, religious pacifists have tried numerous alter-
natives to paying for war: voluntarily earning so little that their incomes fall
below taxable levels; refusing to file with the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS); filing with the IRS but refusing to pay; filing and paying income
taxes but seeking a "war tax refund"; paying their taxes to peaceful agen-
cies and a host of other ad hoc solutions. 3 Because these alternatives cause
pacifists to change their lifestyles radically, force them to endure jail
sentences, or worse, to violate their consciences, pacifists have found none
of the alternatives to be satisfactory.
In recognition of this country's long-standing tax resistance history, and
to solve the resister's dilemma, Sen. Mark Hatfield (R. Ore.) and others
have proposed the World Peace Tax Fund Act (WPTFA).4 Specifically, the
Act would require pacifists to tender 100% of the tax owed on their in-
comes but would restrict the government's use of these revenues to peaceful
purposes.
This Article will analyze the constitutional dimensions of religious resist-
ance to war taxes and propose that relief for conscientious objectors is sen-
sible in light of this country's long and substantial history of such
resistance. In addition, the World Peace Tax Fund Act will be explained
briefly and consideration will be given to the issue of whether passage of
the Act would be in the best interests of pacifism.
RELIGIOUS RESISTANCE TO WAR TAXATION IN AMERICA
Judicially created law in the United States is punctuated with frequent
references to history as precedent. For example, in Walz v. Tax Commis-
sioner', the United States Supreme Court relied in substantial part upon the
long-standing historical tradition of granting property tax exemptions to
churches to uphold the constitutionality of such exemptions. 6
In contrast, when considering the legitimacy of war tax resistance, nearly
all courts steadfastly have refused to recognize, or simply have been ig-
norant of, the long history of religious resistance to war taxes in this coun-
3. See D. KAUFMAN, THE TAX DILEMMA: PRAYING FOR PEACE, PAYING FOR WAR 51-67
(1978) [hereinafter cited as TAX DILEMMA]. See also infra note 91 and accompanying text.
4. S. 880, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 2-12 (amending I.R.C. §§ 2210, 2506, 6017B, 6099
(West Supp. 1980)), 125 CONG. REC. 7181-85 (1979) [hereinafter cited as S. 880].
5. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
6. 397 U.S. at 676-78. As Justice Burger stated:
Few concepts are more deeply embedded in the fabric of our national life, be-
ginning with pre-Revolutionary colonial times, than for the government to exercise
at the very least this kind of benevolent neutrality toward churches and religious
exercise generally so long as none was favored over others and none suffered in-
terference.
Id. at 676-77. See also Hurvich, Religion and the Taxing Power, 35 U. CIN. L. REV. 531,
534-35 (tracing tax exemption for the Christian church to that originated in the fourth century
A.D. by the Roman emperor Constantine).
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try.' Likewise, Congress has refused to accommodate religious objectors to
war through legislation. Yet, religious resistance to the conscription of
dollars for war is a serious element of political and spiritual life that has
surfaced throughout American history. This long history of resistance
merits the attention of both judicial and legislative lawmakers.
The American Friends, commonly known as the Quakers, were the first,
and remain the most famous, American resisters. The first instance of
organized Quaker :resistance to war taxes occurred between 1693 and 1711.1
During that period, various requests by the Crown to the Quaker-controlled
Pennsylvania Assembly for monies to fight the French and Indians were
either rebuffed or evaded on the basis of the religious principle that the
Quakers were committed to giving witness to peace."
By 1755, Quaker religious sentiment had divided over war tax resistance,
spurred on by the guilt that city-dwelling Quakers began to feel for not con-
tributing to the defense of their compatriots who were subject to Indian at-
tacks in the frontier areas.'" One prominent Quaker who resisted, and re-
mained faithful to his religious principles, however, was John Woolman. In
his famous journal, a literary masterpiece," Woolman recorded that "the
7. See, e.g., Farmer v. Rountree, 149 F. Supp. 327 (M.D. Tenn. 1956) (court concluded it
was without jurisdiction to review issues of military policy entrusted to other branches of
government), aff'd per curiam, 252 F.2d 490 (6th Cir. 1958); Anthony v. Commissioner, 66
T.C. 367 (1976) (rejecting "war crimes" and free exercise arguments); Egnal v. Commissioner,
65 T.C. 255 (1975) (rejecting "war crimes" argument); Russell v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 942
(1973) (rejecting free exercise and "war crimes" arguments); Muste v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.
913 .(1961) (rejecting free exercise argument). The "war crimes deduction" unsuccessfully
asserted by the petitioners in Anthony, Egnal, Russell, and other cases is based on the theory
that payment of that portion of taxes that would be used to conduct the war in Indochina
would amount to the petitioner's complicity in the commission of war crimes in violation of
the Nuremberg Principles. See Scheide v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 455, 456 (1975).
8. I. SHARPLESS, A QUAKER EXPERIMENT IN GOVERNMENT 195-202 (1898). In 1693, Gover-
nor Fletcher, acting governor of Pennsylvania, knew the difficulties of levying taxes on
Quakers to finance a war and therefore offered an alternative. "If there be any among you
that scruple the giving of money to support war, there are a great many other charges in that
government for the support thereof .. . .Your money shall be converted into these uses and
shall not be dipt in blood." Id. at 196 (citing I COLONIAL RECORDS 361).
9. For example, when the Crown attempted to raise money to hire an army to fight the
French in Canada, the Pennsylvania Assembly resolved
that they could not directly or indirectly raise money for an expedition to Canada,
but they had voted the Queen £ 500 as a token of their respect, etc., and that the
money should be put into a safe hand till they were satisfied from England it
should not be employed for the use of war.
1. SHARPLESS, A QUAKER EXPERIMENT IN GOVERNMENT 201 (1898) (quoting HISTORICAL COL-
LECTIONS RELATING TO THE AMERICAN COLONIAL CHURCH, PENNSYLVANIA 51).
10. For a vivid incident illustrating this point, see THE JOURNAL OF JOHN WOOLMAN 68-69
(J. Whitney ed. 1950) [hereinafter cited as JOURNAL]. See also J. WHITNEY, JOHN WOOLMAN,
AMERICAN QUAKER 212 (1942) [hereinafter cited as QUAKER].
11. Woolman's biographer, Janet Whitney, calls the JOURNAL "the first American classic"
and relates that "Charles Lamb advised those who wished to write well 'to get the writings of
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spirit of truth required of him, as an individual, to suffer patiently the
distress of goods rather than pay war taxes actively."' 2 Thus, when he ar-
rived at the Friends' Yearly Meeting,' 3 he led an effort to have the Friends
oppose the war tax the Pennsylvania Assembly was requesting of the
citizenry. As a result of his efforts, an appeal to conscience was sent to the
Assembly which summarized, perhaps more eloquently than any document
since, the dilemma that conscience tax resisters faced.
Although we shall at all times freely and heartily contribute according to
our circumstances either by the payment of taxes or in such other manner
as may be judged necessary towards the exigencies of government . . . yet
as the raising sums of money and putting them into the hands of commit-
tees who may apply them to purposes inconsistent with the peaceable
testimony we profess and have borne to the world appears to us in its
consequences to be destructive of our religious liberties, we apprehend
many among us will be under the necessity of suffering rather than con-
senting thereto by the payment of a tax for such purposes; and thus the
fundamental part of our constitution may be essentially affected and that
free enjoyment of liberty of conscience for the sake of which our
forefathers left their native country and settled in this, a wilderness, by
degrees be violated."
Nonetheless, the assembly, dominated by a majority that was only
nominally Quaker, turned a deaf ear to the appeal and decided to levy war
taxes. Clearly, Quaker unity on the war tax issue was eroding as principle
gave way to practicality."'
Religious resistance to taxation experienced a revival among Quakers dur-
ing the American Revolution when they resisted taxes earmarked specifically
for war purposes, as opposed to multi-purpose, or "mixed" taxes. As one
historian has observed, "most Friends . . .had a clear sense that . . . both
payment and collaboration with the machinery of levying such tax[es] con-
stituted a contravention of the discipline."'" Quakers also suffered both the
John Woolman by heart.' " Whitney, Preface to THE JOURNAL OF JOHN WOOLMAN at vii (J.
Whitney ed. 1950).
12. JOURNAL, supra note 10, at 66.
13. The Meetings were annual assemblies in which Quakers would discuss and adopt for-
mal positions on various moral issues. Cf. P. BROCK, PACIFISM IN THE UNITED STATES 34
(1968) [hereinafter cited as PACIFISM].
14. QUAKER, supra note 10, at 210-11. Whitney suspects Woolman's hand in the composi-
tion of this appeal. Id. It is certain that other of "the most influential and 'weighty' Quakers
were involved, notably Anthony Benezet, Anthony Morris, John Churchman, and Israel and
John Pemberton." 1. SHARPLESS, A QUAKER EXPERIMENT IN GOVERNMENT 219-20 (1898).
15. According to one historian, all but four Quaker assemblymen voted in favor of levying
a war tax "evidently regarding [their coreligionists' plea) as an uncalled-for intervention in
what was none of their business." PACIFISM, supra note 13, at 139. Woolman's influence as an
individual resister continued, however, as fellow resisters turned to him for advice. See JOUR-
NAL, supra note 10, at 74; QUAKER, supra note 10, at 242.
16. PACIFISM, supra note 13, at 209-10. Brock notes that at least one Quaker, Eli Yarnell,
refused appointment as a tax collector because many of the taxes he would be obliged to col-
lect would be allocated for war purposes. Consequently, Yarnell suffered a fine and distraint.
Id. at 209 n.54 (citing BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES AND ANECDOTES OF MEMBERS OF THE RELIGIOUS
SOCIETY OF FRIENDS 326-28 (1870)).
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customary distraint of goods as well as prison sentences for resistance to
"mixed" and specific war taxes. 7 In addition to the Quakers, there was a
substantial group of Mennonites in Pennsylvania who refused to comply
with requests for war taxes." Although suspicions abound that the Men-
nonites' refusal was based on their respect of the King rather than on a
religious doctrine,' 9 at least one of their prominent members practiced prin-
cipled refusal. The Mennonite Andrew Ziegler believed that forcing Men-
nonite people to pay war taxes was the equivalent of "forcing non-resistant
people to go to war." 2 Apart from the physical danger involved in war,
Ziegler saw no difference between going to war and paying the tax which
supported the war. 2'
In both the Revolutionary War and the War of 1812, some Quakers
perceived that levies attached to imported products were enacted for the
purpose of supporting military activities.22 Thus, Quakers like Joshua Evans
(1731-1798) and Isaac Martin (1758-1828) refused to buy or sell imported
items. As a result, Evans and Martin suffered social and financial setbacks
for their witness.
2
'
The seizure of property was one inconvenience willingly suffered by early
American war tax resisters that still is endured today. Neither seizure,' nor
apparently any other sanction, was feared by New Hampshire Shakers
when, in 1818, their state attempted to extract taxes from them to support
the state military. Their response to the state legislature was that the com-
mands of individual conscience should be placed above those of men. It
rivals the Pennsylvania Friends' appeal24 in eloquence:
[sihould we consent to pay a tax as an equivalent this could be a virtual
acknowledgement that the liberty of conscience is not our natural right;
but may be purchased at a stated price.
Such a concession involves in it, a principle derogatory to the Almighty;
because it requires us to purchase of government, liberty to serve God
with our persons, at the expense of sinning against him with our property.
17. PACIFISM, supra note 13, at 210-11. Some Pennsylvania Quakers spent periods of up
to two years in prison for nonpayment of taxes. Id. at 211.
18. Bender, Taxation in 4 MENNONITE ENCYCLOPEDIA 688 (1959); J. WENGER, A HISTORY
OF THE MENNONITES OF THE FRANCONIA CONFERENCE 346 (1937).
19. J. WENGER, A HISTORY OF THE MENNONITES OF THE FRANCONIA CONFERENCE 346
(1937). One author surmises that in influential Quaker circles, strong pro-British sentiment may
have helped to exacerbate the reluctance to pay money to a rebellious administration.
PACIFISM, supra note 13, at 210.
20. J. RUTH, 'TWAS SEEDING IME: A MENNONITE VIEW OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 71
(1976), quoted in TAX DILEMMA, supra note 3, at 22.
21. TAX DILEMMA, supra note 3, at 22 (citing J. RUTH, 'TWAS SEEDING TIME: A MEN-
NONITE VIEW OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 163 (1976)).
22. PACIFISM, supra note 13, at 353.
23. Id. at 353-54. Martin, especially, suffered financial loss because, as a shopkeeper, he
had chosen not to sell such dutied goods even if he had them in stock. Id. at 354. Modern
analogues to Evans and Martin are those resisters who keep their incomes below taxable levels
to avoid the tax dilemma.
24. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
19821
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW
Therefore viewing the liberty of conscience more dear to us than life
itself, we feel ourselves impelled by the most sacred obligations of duty,
to decline . . . doing any thing whatever to aid, or abet the cause of war,
let the consequences be what they may.25
Quakers and some members of other peace denominations rarely
hesitated in their refusal to pay levies that were clearly earmarked for finan-
cing war activities.26 One became a witness to peace by refusing to pay such
taxes. No common agreement has existed, however, among tax resisters,
Quakers, or others, regarding an appropriate stance toward "taxes in the
mixture," general taxes levied for military and non-military purposes.
This issue was particularly acute on each side of the Mason-Dixon line
during the Civil War. In the North, Joshua Maule was the leading exponent
of the doctrine that payment of taxes known to be partially financing war
efforts constituted a breach of faith with peace testimony. Maule practiced
his understanding of Quaker. principles by enacting a personal variation of
the World Peace Tax Fund Act. In 1861, he calculated that 8.5% percent of
his taxes were employed for the war effort. He then deducted this share and
paid the balance. Consequently, the government seized his goods to remedy
the deficiency.27 Maule continued this practice in the following years but he
never was able to convince the Quaker majority of the propriety of his posi-
tion. The Western Yearly Meeting of 1861 and the New England Yearly
Meeting of 1862 refused to put their imprimatur on the Maule position and,
thus, did not urge their members to refuse to pay mixed taxes.28
An equally moderate position in the North was taken during the Civil
War by the Church of the Brethren. The Church's Annual Conference
counseled members against paying bounty money for military substitutes
but urged them not to resist the fines and taxes that inevitably followed
such refusal.29
25. A Memorial of the Society of People commonly called Shakers, containing a brief
statement of the principles and reasons on which their objections and conscientious aversion to
bearing arms, hiring substitutes, or paying an equivalent in lieu thereof, are founded (June,
1818), quoted in CONSCIENCE IN AMERICA 77 (L. Schlissel ed. 1968).
26. See PACIFISM, supra note 13, at 209, 417.
27. Id. at 761-62. Throughout the Civil War, Maule was troubled that most Quakers con-
sented to paying general taxes just as they had in peacetime. He believed that these people had
failed to truly examine the full implications of their pacifism. Maule attributed this failure to
the fact that influential Quakers had advised tax payment. Id. at 762.
28. The Western Meeting stated, "We feel that we escape condemnation when the
Magistrate and not the tax payer assumes the responsibility of its specific appropriations."
Min. of the Meeting for Sufferings of Western Yearly Meeting 40 (Sept. 19, 1861), quoted in
E. WRIGHT, CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS IN THE CIVIL WAR 48 (2d ed. 1961). The New England
Meeting urged members to continue to pay their taxes "cheerfully ... without attempting to
make any impracticable distinctions respecting such taxes as may be imposed upon them for
the support of our Government." Min. of the Meeting for Sufferings of New England Yearly
Meeting 274 (Aug. 20, 1862), quoted in E. WRIGHT, CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS IN THE CIVIL
WAR 48 (2d ed. 1961).
29. R. BOWMAN, THE CHURCH OF THE BRETHREN AND WAR, 1708-1941, 'at 118-19 (1971).
The Mennonites, who also took a moderate position, found a welcome home in Kansas. The
[Vol. 31:497
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The question of tax resistance also was raised in the South with no clear
resolution. Quakers in Virginia and North Carolina were urged by their
respective Meetings to resist military service and the fines accompanying
such resistance. These Meetings, however, specifically drew the line at that
point; the payment of "all taxes" was to continue.3"
Religious resistance to war taxes virtually disappeared during World War
I as the peace movement was challenged. by the overpowering demand for
ideological uniformity.3' The incidents of active resistance that did occur
took the form of opposition to conscription and the refusal to buy the
Liberty Bonds that the government depended upon to support the war ef-
fort." Between World War I and II, with the moral problems of financing
war and patriotism no longer of immediate concern, the tax resistance
movement remained dormant.33 Among churches, only the Church of the
Brethren evinced an institutional concern, but this concern fell short of urg-
ing outright tax refusal.3" Resistance continued to be slight throughout most
state, trying to attract settlers after the Civil War, excused Mennonites from the $30 tax levied
on those who wished to be relieved of military service. Whatever the state's motivation, this is
a rare example of an exemption for those taxpayers who conscientiously object. TAX DILEMMA,
supra note 3, at 36-37.
30. E. WRIGHT, CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS IN THE CIVIL WAR 97 (2d ed. 1931). The
Quakers of both Virginia and North Carolina endorsed the view that "we pay all taxes imposed
on us as citizens, remembering the injunction, 'Tribute to whom tribute is due, custom to
whom custom'; believing that upon the Government rests the responsibility of how they expend
this tribute or custom." Id. (quoting Min. of Yearly Meeting for Sufferings of N. Carolina,
1861).
31. In the words of one author, "Their spirits low, sorrow in their hearts, they bowed to
the inevitable." M. CURTI, PEACE OR WAR, THE AMERICAN STRUGGLE, 1636-1936, at 254-55
(1936). See also C. CHATFIELD, FOR PEACE AND JUSTICE: PACIFISM IN AMERICA, 1914-1941, at
25 (1971) (when the United States entered World War I, new pacifist groups cast about for
public support, as many former leaders of the pacifist movement accepted the war effort and
gave up peace work).
32. One writer has documented the cases of three such bond resisters who were subjected
to varying forms of mob violence. See TAX DILEMMA, supra note 3, at 39-40. A minority of
members of the Church of the Brethren also refused to purchase Liberty Bonds. R. BOWMAN,
THE CHURCH OF THE BRETHREN AND WAR, 1708-1941, at 94 (1971).
33. The troubles experienced by the pacifist movement in the inter-war period are il-
lustrated in microcosm by the defections from, and changes in emphasis of, the American
Fellowship of Reconciliation. For a summary of this period, see P. BROCK, TWENTIETH CEN-
TURY PACIFISM 142-50 (1970).
34. In response to a query from a West Virginia Brethren group, the Church's 1933 Con-
ference'advised resisters to:
1. Paste a small sticker in your income tax returns and other payments made to
the federal government, which reads as follows: "That portion of this tax devoted
to armaments and war preparedness is paid under protest." The Board of Chris-
tian Education will furnish these stickers.
2. Write a letter once a year to your congressmen protesting against the ap-
propriation of funds for military and naval purposes.
3. Protest personally when paying federal taxes, such as the federal gasoline tax.
4. Protest through resolutions from local churches, district and Annual Con-
ferences.
R. BOWMAN, THE CHURCH OF THE BRETHREN AND WAR, 1708-1941, at 239 (1971).
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW
of World War II because that war most closely approximated the "just"
war.
3
5
In contrast to the relative indifference to the tax question that
characterized the post-World War I period, the final weeks of World War
II, specifically the atomic tragedies of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, left in their
wake shocked consciences and renewed dedication to war tax resistance.
Shortly after the war ended, a disparate group of pacifists met in Chicago
and formed the Committee for Non-Violent Revolution (Committee). The
Committee, a coalition of many groups, broadly attacked capitalism and
militarism. In particular, the organization urged the citizenry to "refuse to
serve in the armed forces, give financial support to the government, [and]
work in war plants or cooperate with the conscription program.""6
The Committee did very little before it was absorbed into a more suc-
cessful post-war group, the Peacemakers. Peacemakers was formed in April
of 1948 as a "network of local, radical pacifist cells" openly urging
resistance to war-making efforts, particularly to the draft.3" More impor-
tantly, the Peacemakers made a specific, concerted effort to encourage tax
resistance through a sub-group of Peacemakers, the Tax Refusal Commit-
tee, who vigorously promoted war tax resistance through publications and
public statements.3" The religious strain in the Peacemaker movement
revealed itself in the words of one member who declared: "How can I in
decency turn over money to pay another to make or use . . . atrocious
weapons on other human beings and children of God?" 9
One Peacemaker who dominated the post-war tax resistance movement in
the United States was A.J. Muste.1° Beginning in January, 1948, Muste
35. Historian Roland Bainton has written:
All such discussion [of pacifism] was cut short in the United States by Pearl Har-
bor. As usual in war, pacifism receded .... By and large ... concerted opposition
to the war had folded up. The main reason was that the Japanese attack had
solidified the country .... The Axis powers certainly did their best to provide for
the United Nations all the normal conditions of the just war. Many former
pacifists argued that under the circumstances the best way to further the peace was
to finish the war.
R. BAINTON, CHRISTIAN ATTITUDES TOWARD WAR AND PEACE 220 (1960). See also P. BROCK,
TWENTIETH CENTURY PACIFISM 157 (1970) (pacifists more unified with non-pacifists during
World War II and consequently, willing to serve community rather than protest).
36. Rep. of Feb. Conf. on Non-Violent Revolutionary Socialism in Chicago, (Feb. 6-9,
1946), quoted in L. WITTNER, REBELS AGAINST WAR: THE AMERICAN PEACE MOVEMENT,
1941-1960, at 155 (1969) [hereinafter cited as WITTNER].
37. WITTNER, supra note 36, at 157.
38. Id. at 158. "Non-payment took two forms: earning less than the minimum taxable
balance, or earning more than the minimum but refusing to pay all or part." Id.
39. Id.
40. Muste, an eclectic religious figure, was ordained a minister of the Dutch Reformed
Church in 1909, served as a pastor of a Congregational Church in Newtonville, Massachusetts
during World War I, and was a member of the Society of Friends. When he became the ex-
ecutive secretary of the Fellowship of Reconciliation, a World War 11 pacifist group, Muste
relinquished the pastorate of his last church. See generally N. HENTOFF, PEACE AGITATOR: THE
STORY OF A.J. MUSTE (1963) [hereinafter cited as HENTOFF].
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refused to voluntarily pay any of his federal income taxes because he "had
to find every possible means to divorce [himself] from any voluntary sup-
port of the crowning irrationality and atrocity of atomic and bacterial
war.""' His resistance eventually brought him into court in one of the early
Tax Court decisions on religious resistance to war taxes, Muste v. Commis-
sioner.' 2
Muste previewed the arguments that were to be used, albeit unsuccessfully,
in subsequent war tax resistance cases.' 3 Muste argued that the first amend-
ment immunized him from paying war taxes; that he could not be compelled
to pay war taxes "by virtue of the Nuremburg Principles of International
Law";" and that, should he have been forced to pay, the Constitution ex-
cused him from affirmatively cooperating with the collection process.'"
Although the Tax Court rejected these arguments and refused to exempt
Muste from taxation, the court did not find Muste guilty of tax fraud. By
noting that Muste had not attempted to conceal his earnings from the Inter-
nal Revenue Service and had no evil motive in refusing to file,' 6 the court
provided Muste with a limited victory."
Muste was undaunted by the court's decision that his religious beliefs did
not excuse him from paying income taxes. He remained a strong leader in
the Fellowship of Reconciliation, and continued to resist tax payments until
his death in 1967."' Muste, who served as a model for other religious tax
resisters during his lifetime,' 9 died before he could witness the relatively
broad-based resistance to war taxes that the Vietnam War sparked.
In the late 1960's, to help finance the military effort in Vietnam, the na-
tional government imposed an excise tax on telephone use, the proceeds
from which tacitly were assumed to finance the war. 0 The tax was an ideal
41. Id at 125 (quoting letter from Muste to New York Times, United States Attorney
General, and Federal District Attorney in New York (1949)).
42. 35 T.C. 913 (1961).
43. See infra note 87.
44. Id. at 917. Muste's attorney, Cornell law professor Harrop Freeman, relied on the
following statement of the Nuremberg Tribunal, citing the Atlantic Charter, to justify Muste's
refusal to support war: "The very essence of the [Atlantic] Charter is that individuals have in-
ternational duties which transcend the National obligations of obedience imposed by the in-
dividual State." HENTOFF, supra note 40, at 127.
45. 35 T.C. at 917.
46. Id. at 921.
47. See HENTOFF, supra note 40, at 127-28. Freeman, Muste's attorney, explained that he
and Muste decided not to appeal because the tax fraud decision was resolved in their favor and
they might have lost on appeal. Id.
48. TAX DILEMMA, supra note 3, at 42.
49. One resister remarked, "When a man as respected as A.J. refuses to pay taxes, it's like
Jeremiah walking down the street naked. People stop, look, and listen." HENTOFF, supra note
40, at 129.
50. Tax Adjustment Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-368, § 202, 80 Stat. 66 (1966) (amended
1968). The Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, Wilbur Mills, explained on
the House floor that the bill was "intended first and foremost to provide additional revenues
to help finance the expenditures required to sustain our operation in Vietnam." 112 CONG.
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target for war resisters for several reasons. First, it was readily identifiable
as a war tax because Congress had recognized it as such. Second, it was not
the "tax in the mixture" that historically has given Quakers and others
trouble. Third, individuals could resist the tax by simply omitting it when
paying their telephone bills without running the risk of having the telephone
company terminate service. Consequently, thousands of war protestors, in-
cluding significant numbers of religious persons,5 ' resisted payment of this
tax. 2 In addition, some religious institutions, including a few Mennonite
and Church of the Brethren congregations, withheld their telephone taxes as
organizational actions."
Although non-religious resistance to this excise tax has declined today,
many religiously motivated resisters still refuse to pay the tax."' More im-
REC. 3676 (1966) (remarks of Rep. Mills). The Vietnam War continued and the tax was extended
in 1968 for two additional years. Act of June 28, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-364, § 105, 82 Stat.
265 (1968) (amended 1970). In 1970, Congress approved another two year extension, but with
the provision that it be reduced by 1076 each year thereafter with the tax being entirely repealed
on Jan. 1, 1982. Act of Dec. 31, 1970, ch. 33, § 201, 84 Stat. 1843 (repealed 1982).
51. Telephone conversation with Rev. James B. Callan, Administrator of Corpus Christi
Church, Rochester, N.Y. (Nov. 23, 1980). Father Callan was one of those who publicly refused
to pay their phone taxes during the Vietnam War.
52. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) monitored tax protest cases during the Vietnam
War era. The following table is derived from figures reported in a series of memoranda, dated
1968 through 1973, from the IRS Program Review and Analytical Staff to the IRS Collection
Division Director.
Vietnam Tax Protest Cases, 1968-1973
Telephone Tax Income Tax
1968 17,631 557
1969 15,016 1,401
1970 28,760 1,648
1971 56,445 1,740
1972 70,545 303
1973* 34,738 644
* First six months only.
See I.R.S. Memorandum, Vietnam Protest Cases (Oct. 2, 1968, Feb. 25, 1969, May 14, 1969,
Aug. 14, 1969, Nov. 14, 1969, Feb. 4, 1970); I.R.S. Memorandum, Vietnam Tax Pro-
testors-CY 1971 (Mar. 22, 1972); I.R.S. Memorandum, Vietnam Protest for CY 1972 (Jan.
24, 1973); I.R.S. Memorandum, Vietnam Protest Activity and Airline Excise Tax Protests (July
25, 1973).
Because of the significant decrease in reported income tax protest cases from 1971 to 1972,
the figure given for 1972 is suspect. In its memo for the period, the IRS itself confesses, "it is
difficult for us to imagine why the income tax protests have shown such a drastic decrease."
I.R.S. Memorandum, Vietnam Protest for CY 1972 (Jan. 24, 1973).
53. See TAX DILEMMA, supra note 3, at 48.
54. Conversations with Rev. William Spilly, Office of Human Development of the Roman
Catholic Diocese of Rochester, Geneva, N.Y. (July, 1981) and John McNeill, Peace & Justice
Educ. Center, Rochester, N.Y. (July, 1981). Father Spilly and the Peace & Justice Educ.
Center each withheld the excise tax on their telephone bills to protest both military spending
and American policy on El Salvador.
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portantly, however, resistance to the use of income taxes for military pur-
poses again has become the subject of debate. One Catholic archbishop has
publicly called for Catholics to consider resisting their income taxes to pro-
test governmental spending on nuclear arms." Some individual Catholics
and Protestants have joined forces with members of the historic peace chur-
ches to form the Center on Law and Pacifism. The Center, "a religious
pacifist organization" in the "Jewish and Christian tradition," has offered
legal services to religious tax resisters. 6 Finally, the National Council for a
World Peace Tax Fund has lobbied Congress for an exemption for religious
resisters from war taxes. 7
THE WORLD PEACE TAX FUND ACT
Presently, all federal income tax is paid into the general fund of the
United States Treasury. Consequently, once the annual federal budget is ap-
proved, taxpayers have no control over the use of their tax dollars. Because
a large portion of the budget is devoted to spending for military purposes,"
pacifists justifiably fear that substantial portions of their taxes support such
expenditures." Like their historical counterparts, today's pacifists base their
objection on the religious ground that one cannot follow the teaching to
love one's enemy and yet pay to kill that enemy.6 0
55. Nat'l Cath. Rep., July 3, 1981, at 1, col. 2. Catholic Archbishop Raymond G. Hunt-
hausen of Seattle, speaking to the Pacific Lutheran Convention stated: "I think the teaching of
Jesus tells us to render to a nuclear-arms Caesar what that Caesar deserves-tax resistance."
Id.
56. See PEOPLE PAY FOR PEACE I (W. Durland ed. 1980). See also Nat'l Cath. Rep., July
3, 1981, at 23, col. 1 (the War Tax Resisters organizations in New York and Washington,
D.C., the Center on Law and Pacifism in Philadelphia, and related groups provide advice and
support to tax resisters).
57. NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR A WORLD PEACE TAX FUND, WORLD PEACE TAX FUND: TAX-
PAYERS IN PURSUIT OF PEACE (undated pamphlet). The World Peace Tax Fund has been endorsed
by a number of religious bodies, including the United Methodist Church, the United Church of
Christ, the Church of the Brethren, the Mennonite Church, the General Conference of the
Mennonite Church, the U.S. Catholic Conference's Division of World Peace and Justice, and
the Friends Committee on National Legislation. Id.
58. The New York Times estimates that, as of June, 1980, military spending consumed
25% of the federal budget and would rise to 28076 within the next five years. N.Y. Times, June
18, 1980, at A16, col. 1. The federal budget, of course, contains huge amounts of money from
"trust funds" (e.g., Social Security, highway, and airport trust funds). When these budget
outlays are set aside and only income tax revenue is examined, the percentage of military-
related spending rises to 49.1%. NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR A WORLD PEACE TAX FUND, How
MUCH OF YOUR TAX DOLLAR WENT FOR MILITARY PURPOSES? (1980).
59. The historic counterparts to today's pacifists never reached a consensus regarding taxes
in the mixture because many had no objection to paying such taxes. See supra text accompany-
ing notes 23-25.
60. One pacifist has inquired:
How can one pray for peace and pay for war?
If I were to say to you, "1 will not kill my neighbor, but I will pay for someone
else to do it," would you not question my integrity? If we refuse to kill our
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Tax resisters, however, have no desire to withhold that portion of their
taxes allocated to non-military purposes.61 Because taxpayers are currently
unable to restrict the use of their taxes to support only non-military pro-
grams, a dilemma arises: pacifists must either pay taxes and violate their
consciences or resist payment and suffer civil and, possibly, criminal
penalties.62 Ironically, the civil penalties resulting from resistance simply
enrich the Treasury.
The World Peace Tax Fund Act 63 is designed to rescue pacifists from this
dilemma. Under the Act, the Comptroller General is obligated to determine
"the percentage of actual appropriations made by the United States from
the Federal Funds Budget during the preceding fiscal year which were made
for a military purpose.""' This percentage is multiplied by the sum of the
federal income, estate, and gift taxes paid by the conscientious objector.
The resulting amount, representing that portion of the objector's taxes that
otherwise would have been spent for military purposes, is then transferred
to the World Peace Tax Fund (Fund). 5 The balance of the objector's taxes
is deposited in the general fund, with the proviso that "no part of the
neighbor but allow our government to do it with our money, are we not to be held
accountable?
PEOPLE PAY FOR PEACE 3-4 (W. Durland ed. 1980).
61. This position has its roots in the Quaker tradition of paying taxes "in the mixture",
which Quakers believe "Christ had required his followers to pay regardless of the fact that
Caesar might apply a part for war purposes." PACIFISM, supra note 13, at 31.
62. For a discussion of the consequences of resistance, see PEOPLE PAY FOR PEACE 15-19
(W. Durland ed. 1980).
63. S. 880, supra note 4.
64. Id. at § 6(a). Obviously, the figure indicating the percentage of the budget that was
spent for military purposes will be accurate only to the extent that the percentage of the
preceding year's military expenditures approximates the current year's. The Act defines
military purposes as "any activity or program conducted, administered, or sponsored by an
agency of the Government which effects augmentation of military forces, defensive and offen-
sive intelligence activities, or enhances the capability of any person or nation to wage war." Id.
at § I1(1). The Act also states that "actual appropriations for military purpose" includes but is
not limited to amounts appropriated by the United States in connection with:
(A) the Department of Defense;
(B) the Central Intelligence Agency;
(C) the National Security Council;
(D) the Selective Service System;
(E) activities of the Department of Energy that have a military purpose;
(F) activities of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration that have a
military purpose;
(G) foreign military aid, and foreign economic aid made available to any country
for the purpose of releasing local funds for military activities; and
(H) the training, supplying, or maintaining of military personnel, or the manufac-
ture, construction, maintenance, or development of military weapons, installations,
or strategies.
Id. at § 11(2).
65. Id. at § 6(b). The World Peace Tax Fund would be established under § 2 of the pro-
posed Act. Id. at § 2.
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money [so] transferred to the general fund . . .shall be appropriated for
any expenditures, or otherwise obligated for military purposes." 66
The Act directs that the Fund will be controlled by an eleven member
Board of Trustees appointed by the President and Congress. 7 The Board is
authorized to support a variety of peaceful activities through grants, loans,
and other funding mechanisms. 8 Such activities would include efforts
toward disarmament, the retraining of workers displaced by conversion
from military construction, the improvement of international health, educa-
tion, and welfare, and research directed toward peaceful resolution of inter-
national disputes.6 9
Taxpayer Eligibility
The Act also delineates the standards for determining which taxpayers are
eligible to have their taxes segregated between the Fund and non-military
governmental spending.70 These standards are based on section 6(j) of the
Military Selective Service Act.7' Essentially, an eligible individual is one
who claims on his or her tax return to be conscientiously opposed to war in
any form and who either has been given conscientious objector status by
the Selective Service System, or can prove to the Secretary of the Treasury
(Secretary) that he or she, by religious training and belief, is conscientiously
opposed to participation in war in any form." An important guideline sup-
plied by the Selective Service Act provides that "religious training and
belief" does not include "essentially political, sociological, or philosophical
views, or a merely personal code.""
From the preceding summary of the statute, one might deduce that the
criteria necessary to be set forth on the tax return to enable a taxpayer to
obtain objector status are: (1) that the taxpayer be opposed to participation
in all wars; (2) that his objection be based on "religious training and
belief"; and (3) that his objection not be based on political, sociological,
66. Id. at § 6(c). The difficulty with this last provision is manifest: What guarantee will the
objector have that these monies will not be used, as are other general funds, for military pur-
poses? Although it appears that the sponsors of the Act wanted to insure that the non-military
portion of objectors' taxes be used for non-military purposes, they failed to establish a special
second fund for their disbursement.
67. Id. at §§ 7(a)-(b). Under the terms of the Act, the President would appoint nine of the
eleven Board members with a maximum of five from the same political party. The President
Pro Tempore of the Senate would appoint one Board member from the Senate membership
and the Speaker of the House would appoint the last member from the House membership. Id.
68. Id. at § 8(a).
69. Id. at § 8(c).
70. See id. at § 3(a).
71. 50 U.S.C. app. § 456(j) (1976). Section 4560) would be incorporated into § 3(a) of the
proposed Act. Section 4560) exempts from military service persons who "by reason of
religious training and belief [are] conscientiously opposed to war in any form." Id.
72. S. 880, supra note 4, at § 3(a).
73. Military Selective Service Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 4560) (1976).
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philosophical, or personal views. If these are the only criteria listed on the
return, however, the Secretary will be doing many taxpayers a disservice in
that a number of legally eligible objectors would not designate themselves
as such. A simple listing of the statutory criteria, based in part on section
60) of the Selective Service Act, would be inadequate because it would not
reflect the broader interpretation of section 60) that the Supreme Court
provided in Welsh v. United States." Specifically, the Court held that per-
sons qualify as conscientious objectors if (a) their opposition to war stems
from their moral, ethical, or religious beliefs about what is right and
wrong, and (b) these beliefs are held with the strength of religious convic-
tions.7" Therefore, in fairness to taxpayers, the Secretary should be required
to provide criteria consistent with the Welsh decision.
Should the Secretary believe that such liberalized criteria are being abused,
the proposed Act enables him or her to require anyone claiming objector
status on his or her income tax returns to "provide such additional infor-
mation as may be necessary to verify his status" as an objector." This
language will apply to a large part of the objector population and will in-
clude all persons never before the Selective Service System or its
predecessors and all those objector applications that were rejected by the
System or its predecessors. As a result, a significant part of the objector
population unfortunately might be subject to the limited discretionary
power vested in the Secretary. Far less discretion would be vested in the
Secretary if pacifists were required to examine section 60) of the Selective
Service Act and determine for themselves whether the criteria are met. Such
a procedure would not encourage abuse because taxpayers do not escape
any tax liability by determining that they are eligible to segregate tax funds.
Although the Secretary potentially could abuse his power of discretion in
the same manner displayed by local draft boards during past wars," a solu-
74. 398 U.S. 333 (1970). The Welsh case involved a defendant who was convicted for refus-
ing to serve in the Armed Forces despite his claim for conscientious objector status under § 60)
of the Military Selective Service Act. Id. at 335. In filling out his exemption application, Welsh
was unable to sign the statement as provided on the Selective Service form. The statement
read: "I am, by reason of my religious training and belief, conscientiously opposed to par-
ticipation in war of any form." Id. at 336-37. Welsh signed only after striking the words "my
religious training and" because he had discontinued his childhood religious ties. Id. Never-
theless, because the defendant's beliefs functioned as a religion in his life, the Court held that
he was just as entitled to a "religious" conscientious objector exemption under § 60) "as is
someone who derives his conscientious opposition to war from traditional religious
convictions." Id. at 340.
75. Id. at 339-40. The Welsh Court's holding was controlled by an earlier Supreme Court
decision, United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965). In Seeger, which involved strikingly
similar facts, the Court stated that in determining whether one qualifies for the service exemp-
tion "[the] task is to decide whether the beliefs professed by a registrant are sincerely held and
whether they are, in his own scheme of things, religious." Id. at 185 (emphasis added).
76. S. 880, supra note 4, at § 3(a).
77. See, e.g., Wolff v. Selective Serv. Local Bd. No. 16, 372 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1967)
(local board acted without authority in reclassifying registrants because of their demonstration
against Vietnam conflict); Townsend v. Zimmerman, 237 F.2d 376 (6th Cir. 1956) (injunction
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tion for arbitrary and inconsistent applications of the criteria is provided in
the Act. Any time the Secretary determines that a taxpayer does not meet
the requirements to qualify for tax segregation, the Secretary must seek a
declaratory judgment in support of his decision from the United States
District Court in which the taxpayer resides.78 Thus, objectors are. protected
from inconsistent and capricious applications of the Act without placing a
heavy litigation burden upon them. By placing this burden on the Secretary
on a case-by-case basis, the Act creates an incentive for the Secretary to
bring only those cases that represent a serious challenge to his interpretation
of the law. Consequently, although most objectors will be self-selected, a
uniform characterization of objectors will prevail.
The Act limits participation to those who are opposed to war in any
form." The Supreme Court has strictly interpreted the Selective Service
Act, which also requires opposition to all wars,8" to exclude selective objec-
tors from official objector status.8 Accordingly, selective conscientious ob-
jectors, such as Roman Catholics who hold to their church's traditional
"just war" theology,8" would be excluded under the WPTFA just as they
issued restraining induction order of local board which had reopened registrant's classification
but had refused to allow appeal).
Claims that local boards have abused their discretion most often arose where a board had
refused to reopen a registrant's classification after the registrant had presented new facts. The
board was held to have abused its discretion if it had no basis in fact for refusing to reopen.
See, e.g., United States v. Ransom, 223 F.2d 15 (7th Cir. 1955) (local board had no basis in
fact for denying registrant ministerial classification); Olvera v. United States, 223 F.2d 880 (5th
Cir. 1955) (local board's refusal to reopen registrant's classification was arbitrary and
unreasonable where board maintained it did not have to do so); United States v. Majher, 250
F. Supp. 106 (S.D.W. Va. 1966) (local board acted without basis in fact in summarily refusing
registrant a hearing on contention that he was a duly ordained minister).
Other courts, however, have spoken as if there were no limitations on a draft board's discre-
tion. See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 157 F.2d 176 (4th Cir.) (whether additional evidence
submitted to local draft board after classification of registrant is of sufficient weight to require
a reopening of case is within board's discretion), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 776 (1946); United
States v. Messerman, 128 F. Supp. 759 (M.D. Pa. 1955) (whether letter from registrant who
claimed to be a minister therein was of sufficient weight to require reopening of case lay within
discretion of local board); United States v. Blankenship, 127 F. Supp. 760 (S.D.W. Va. 1954)
(decisions of local boards made in conformity with regulation are final and nonreviewable,
even though erroneous).
Judicial review of local draft boards has been extensively treated. For a full discussion of
this topic, see Comment, The Selective Service System: An Administrative Obstacle Course, 54
CALIF. L. REV. 2123, 2134-43 (1966); Comment, Fairness and Due Process Under the Selective
Service System, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 1014, 1019-23 (1966); Comment, The Selective Service, 76
YALE L.J. 160, 172-73 (1966).
78. S. 880, supra note 4, at § 3(a).
79. Id. at § 3(a) (amending .R.C. § 6099(b)(l)(A)).
80. Military Selective Service Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 4560) (1976).
81. See Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 443 (1971) (selective objectors, those who
oppose only certain wars, are not termed conscientious objectors because phrase "conscien-
tiously opposed to war in any form" can have only one meaning-opposition to personally
participating in any and all wars).
82. See R. BAINTON, CHRISTIAN ATTITUDES TOWARD WAR AND PEACE 95-100 (1960) (based
on the principles enunciated by St. Augustine, the "just war" is intended to restore peace, is
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are under the Selective Service Act.
The WPTFA, in its most gracious provision, offers a form of amnesty to
those who resisted war taxes prior to the enactment of the Act.83 Civil and
criminal tax resistance penalties are to be vacated if the objector pays his
back taxes plus interest and adequately demonstrates that his prior
resistance was based on non-selective objection.' 4 Finally, to still any fear
that amnesty is being purchased at the cost of conscience, the proposed Act
assures the resister that his payments of back taxes and interest will be
deposited in the Fund for expenditure solely on non-military projects."
THE FATE OF RELIGIOUSLY-BASED WAR TAX RESISTANCE
UNDER THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE: DOOMED TO FAILURE?
From the time of A.J. Muste to the present, religiously motivated objec-
tors have looked to the aegis of the first amendment's free exercise clause
to support their resistance to war taxes.' Yet, the courts consistently have
rebuffed the resister's free exercise argument as well as related arguments."
In the context of the WPTFA, one must consider why the resister's
arguments have failed and whether there is justification to believe such
arguments will succeed in the future.
Belief or Conduct
As a starting point for an analysis of the failure of free exercise attacks
on war taxation, one must ask whether religiously based tax resistance is
religious belief or religious conduct. If resistance is unquestionably belief,
the conclusion is clear and the analysis is simple: the government will not be
permitted to penalize pure belief." If resistance is conduct, the conclusion is
motivated by love, with justice lying on one side only). See also ECONOMIST, Feb. 5, 1983, at
20 (a "just war" must be waged by a legitimate authority, in a just cause, undertaken with the
intention of a just and lasting peace, used as a last resort, should have a reasonable chance of
success, and be fought by morally legitimate methods).
83. See S. 880, supra note 4, at § 3(e)(I)(A)-(B).
84. Id.
85. Id. at § 3(e)(2).
86. Muste was the first to raise an in-court free exercise challenge to war taxes. See Muste
v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 913, 917 (1961). See also supra notes 35-42 and accompanying text.
87. See, e.g., Lull v. Commissioner, 602 F.2d 1166 (4th Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (rejecting
free exercise challenge), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1014 (1980); Autenreith v. Cullen, 418 F.2d 586
(9th Cir. 1969) (rejecting free exercise and "war crimes deduction" arguments), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 1036 (1970); Scheide v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 455 (1975) (rejecting "war crimes
deduction" argument); Egnal v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 255 (1975) (rejecting both "war crimes
deduction" argument and alternative payment to a war tax resistance fund); Russell v. Com-
missioner, 60 T.C. 942 (1973) (rejecting both a free exercise challenge and "war crimes deduc-
tion" argument); Muste v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 913 (1961) (rejecting free exercise
challenge).
88. The Supreme Court has held that the constitutional guarantee of freedom of religious
beliefs is absolute. See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944) (first amendment
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unclear and the conduct must be subjected to further analysis.89
There can be little doubt that war tax resistance is religiously based con-
duct. The resister does not merely think peaceful thoughts in the privacy of
his living room but, rather, actively refuses on April 15th to tender to
Caesar what, allegedly, is Caesar's. This active refusal takes a variety of
forms: some resisters claim a "war tax exemption;" some claim a charitable
deduction for donating that portion of their taxes that otherwise would go
toward military spending; some refuse to pay the percentage of their taxes
that would be devoted to military spending;' 0 and others, like Muste, simply
refuse to pay all taxes.1 Regardless of the method the resister selects,
however, he has chosen to confront the body politic. Whichever method the
taxpayer pursues will have an effect on the social order because refusal to
pay one's share of taxes saddles one's neighbor with a greater burden. In
addition to his own tax liability, the neighbor must pay a proportionate
share of the taxes the resister refuses to pay.
The Test for Religiously Based Conduct
Categorizing tax resistance as religious conduct does not automatically
cloak the resister with the protection of the free exercise clause. Instead, it
triggers a multi-part test to determine whether preeminence should be given
to the resister's conduct or to the government's interest in the activity the
resister opposes. In the last twenty years, the United States Supreme Court
has decided a trilogy of cases from which the contours of this test can be
deduced.
First, in Sherbert v. Verner,92 the Court articulated a two-step approach
to determine whether religious conduct warrants protection under the free
exercise clause of the first amendment. Speaking for the Court, Justice
Brennan stated that, first, there must be some infringement by the state of
a person's constitutional right to the free exercise of religion. 3 Second,
precludes submitting truth of accused's religious beliefs to the jury); Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940) (first amendment protection of freedom to hold religious beliefs is
absolute).
89. See Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961). In analyzing the free exercise claim in
Braunfeld, the Court concluded that unlike the freedom to hold a religious belief, "the
freedom to act even when the action is in accord with one's religious convictions, is not totally
free from legislative restrictions." Id. at 603.
90. See TAx DILEMMA, supra note 3, at 51-67.
91. Muste v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 913 (1961). Muste refused to file returns for the years
1948-52. Muste advised the I.R.S. that he would not pay taxes because to pay any taxes that
were to be used, in part, for preparation for war was contrary to his religious beliefs.
92. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). In Sherbert, a Seventh-day Adventist refused her employer's re-
quest to work on Saturday, the employee's Sabbath day. As a result, she quit her employment.
South Carolina subsequently refused to grant unemployment benefits to her, stating that she
did not meet the state's requirement that a claimant accept suitable work when it was offered.
Id. at 401.
93. Id. at 403.
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there must be a "compelling state interest" that justifies placing this burden
on the individual's free exercise right.' 4
In Wisconsin v. Yoder,9 Chief Justice Burger used a "balancing process"
rather than Brennan's two-step approach. 96 According to the Yoder Court,
"[t]he essence of all that has been said and written on the subject is that
only those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served can
overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion."' 7 Earlier in
the opinion, however, Burger had expressed a standard somewhat similar to
Brennan's approach, stating that "it must appear either that the State does
not deny the free exercise of religious belief by its requirement, or that
there is a state interest of sufficient magnitude to override the interest
claiming protection under the Free Exercise Clause."' 8
The confusion over whether the Court indeed was setting aside Brennan's
linear approach in favor of Burger's balancing test remained until Thomas
v. Review Board.99 Chief Justice Burger again wrote for the Court and
adopted verbatim the "overbalancing" language from Yoder.' °0 His repeti-
tion of the Yoder language appeared only after he qualified the limited
license the government has in the free exercise area. The opinion states:
"[tihe state may justify an inroad on religious liberty by showing that it is
the least restrictive means of achieving some compelling state interest."'
94. Id. (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963)).
95. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). In Yoder, Wisconsin, under the compulsory education statute, had
attempted to force Amish children to attend school until .reaching the age of 16. Id. at 207.
96. See id. at 214. Justice White also apparently endorsed a balancing approach, stating
that "[c]ases such as this one inevitably call for delicate balancing of important but conflicting
interests." Id. at 237 (White, J., concurring). It is interesting to note that Justice Brennan,
who had initiated the linear approach in Sherbert, joined in Justice White's concurring opin-
ion, thus, seemingly endorsing a balancing approach.
97. Id. at 215.
98. Id. at 214.
99. 450 U.S. 707 (1981). In Thomas, a Jehovah's Witness was forced to quit his job for a
foundry and machinery manufacturer when the firm insisted on transferring him from a divi-
sion that produced industrial sheet steel to one that manufactured tank turrets. The employee,
after struggling with his conscience and discussing the matter with at least one co-believer, con-
cluded that his reading of scripture and his understanding of the principles of the Jehovah's
Witnesses prohibited him from accepting a transfer to a division so closely allied with the
military effort. Faced with no alternative, he resigned and applied for Indiana unemployment
benefits. Id. at 710-11. It should be noted, however, that Thomas' co-believer argued to
Thomas that their religion did not require that he refuse the assignment to the tank turret divi-
sion. Id. at 711.
After a variety of appeals, the Indiana Supreme Court denied Thomas benefits because, in
essence, his reason for quitting was not "job-related and objective in character." Thomas v.
Review Bd., _ Ind. __ , 391 N.E.2d 1127, 1129 (1979). The Indiana court maintained
that to award unemployment benefits to Thomas while denying benefits to others who had quit
work for reasons that were not religious, "would violate the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment." Id. at _ , 391 N.E.2d at 1134.
100. 450 U.S. at 718
101. Id. This reference to compelling state interest appearing immediately next to Burger's
words from Yoder regarding "interests of the highest order," implies that the phrases are used
synonymously, thus collapsing the apparent difference between Brennan and Burger on this
score.
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Thus, Thomas added a condition to the traditional balancing test."02
Assuming that the government's interest, in fact, outweighs the believer's
interest, the government is free only to use means that are the least intrusive
upon the believer's liberty.103
When stripped of their semantic clothing, the tests proffered by Burger
and Brennan do not differ in the essential process each requires. Essentially,
the Court requires weighing the state's interests against the believer's free
exercise interests. Only a compelling state interest that cannot be served by
less restrictive means than those challenged can override the believer's free
exercise claim.
Evaluating the Free Exercise Interest
In evaluating the believer's interest, one must determine whether the
resister's claim is "legitimate"' ° and whether the state's burden on the in-
terest is "substantial"" '  rather than merely "incidental."' ' 0 6 Only such
claims, Yoder and Sherbert infer, are eligible for protection. Yet the Court
offers no formula for determining the legitimacy of the believer's interest.
Consequently, legitimacy must be determined by examining how the Court
has ruled on modern free exercise claims.
In Sherbert, the interest involved was a Seventh-day Adventist's desire to
102. The traditional test has been articulated as follows:
A thoroughgoing balancing test would measure three elements of the competing
governmental interest: first, the importance of the secular value underlying the
governmental regulation; second, the degree of proximity and necessity that the
chosen regulatory means bears to the underlying value; and third, the impact that
an exemption for religious reasons would have on the over-all regulatory program.
This assessment of the state's interest would then have to be balanced against the
claim for religious liberty, which would require calculation of two factors: first,
the sincerity and importance of the religious practice for which special protection is
claimed; and second, the degree to which the governmental regulation interferes
with that practice.
Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development (Part I: The
Religious Liberty Guarantee), 80 HARV. L. REV. 1381, 1390 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Gian-
nellal. See also Bastress, Government Regulation and the First Amendment Religion
Clauses-An Analysis of the NLRB Jurisdiction Over Parochial Schools and Their Teachers,
17 DUQ. L. REV. 291, 298-307 (1979) (explaining free exercise clause analysis) [hereinafter cited
as Bastress].
103. The Court, however, had stated previously that the state must show that there are "no
alternative forms of regulation [that] would combat such abuses without infringing First
Amendment rights." Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963).
104. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972). A claim is "legitimate" if the burden
falls directly on a believer's religious faith, and not merely on his or her secular "way of life."
Id. at 215-16.
105. Id. at 218.
106. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963). An incidental burden on the free exercise
of religion may be overcome by "a compelling state interest in the regulation of a subject
within the State's constitutional power to regulate." Id. However, once the burden on free ex-
ercise is found to be substantial, a state may not justify that burden even by offering a com-
pelling state interest.
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honor her Sabbath day. She believed that laboring on the Sabbath violated
a "basic tenet of the Seventh-day Adventist creed." 0 7 Although stating in a
footnote that "[n]o question has been raised . . . concerning the sincerity of
[Sherbert's] religious beliefs," '' the Court offered no characterization of
her practice. From the Court's footnote, however, it is clear that the tenet-
like nature of honoring the Sabbath, firmly rooted in Seventh-day Adventist
belief, was an important consideration in determining the legitimacy of
Sherbert's interest. Similarly, an apparent important factor in the Yoder
Court's evaluation of the Amish claims was that the desire to protect their
children from public schooling in favor of community-based vocational
education was a long-standing and fundamental element of Amish religious
practice. 109
Interests rising to the level of a tenet or precept of an organized religious
community are not clearly present in the case of conscientious resistance to
war taxation. Although some of the historic peace churches, including
among others the Quakers and the Mennonites, have encouraged war tax
resistance among their members, these churches have not made the practice
of war tax resistance a sine qua non of their faiths. Moreover, beyond the
walls of the peace churches, many other resisters find themselves without
any official support from their churches. The divisions within the Catholic
Church on this issue serve as one example. While many priests, nuns, and
prominent laymen preached and practiced resistance to the Vietnam War
excise tax on telephone use," ' such resistance has not become a "tenet" of
the Catholic faith.
Despite the sincere belief of resisters,'' before Thomas it was doubtful
107. Id. at 399 n.l.
108. Id.
109. 406 U.S. at 219. Furthermore, the Yoder Court concluded that the state's objective for
requiring compulsory education was served by the Amish practice of vocational education:
Aided by a history of three centuries as an identifiable religious sect and a long
history as a successful and self-sufficient segment of American society, the Amish
in this case have convincingly demonstrated the sincerity of their religious beliefs,
the interrelationship of belief with their mode of life, the vital role that belief and
daily conduct play in the continued survival of Old Order Amish communities and
their religious organization, and the hazards presented by the State's enforcement
of a statute generally valid as to others. Beyond this, they have carried the even
more difficult burden of demonstrating the adequacy of their alternative mode of
continuing informal vocational education in terms of precisely those overall in-
terests that the State advances in support of its program of compulsory high school
education. In light of this convincing showing, one that probably few other
religious groups or sects could make, and weighing the minimal difference between
what the State would require and what the Amish already accept, it was incumbent
on the State to show with more particularity how its admittedly strong interest in
compulsory education would be adversely affected by granting an exemption to the
Amish.
Id. at 235-36.
110. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
111. At least one court that has confronted the issue of sincerity has found, virtually
without any analysis, that the resister before it was sincere. See, e.g., Autenreith v. Cullen, 418
F.2d 586 (9th Cir. 1969) (conscientious objection to all wars was held sincerely by petitioner).
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whether the Supreme Court would recognize a resister's belief as
"legitimate" until it was expressed and practiced as a fundamental element
of one or more church creeds. In Thomas, however, there was no discus-
sion regarding the "legitimacy" of Thomas' belief. Instead, the Court con-
sidered whether his claim was "religious"'12 simply by inquiring whether
the believer had the "honest conviction" ' 3 that his religious position was
supported by his interpretation of his religion.""4 In the process of consider-
ing whether Thomas' motivation was "religious," the Court overtly set
aside the fact that the Jehovah's Witness religion did not necessarily require
Thomas to take the position that he did. In so doing, the Court noted that,
"[i]ntrafaith differences . . . are not uncommon among followers of a par-
ticular creed, and the judicial process is singularly ill equipped to resolve
such differences in relation to the Religion Clauses.""' Thus, Thomas
offers hope for tax resisters to substantiate their free exercise claims.
In summary, because no church prescribes the resistance of war taxes by
its members," 6 the thrust of Sherbert and Yoder had hindered resisters
from meeting the legitimacy aspect of the Court's balancing test. Those
decisions indicated that a person's belief was not significant unless it had
roots in a religious tenet. Thus, resisters had no legitimate belief which
legally could be burdened by the contested government action. Since the
Thomas Court's departure from the Sherbert-Yoder view, this obstacle has
been removed. Therefore, the question of whether the taxation scheme puts
a substantial burden upon the resister's religious objection to killing in war
now can be considered. '
7
What are the hallmarks of a substantial burden on free exercise? In
Sherbert, the Court likened the burden thrust on Sherbert by her forced
choice between unemployment benefits and practicing her religion to the
burden that would be placed on a believer who was fined for attending a
Saturday worship service." 8 The Court concluded that this type of choice
clearly burdened Sherbert's free exercise." The Thomas Court later re-
ferred to Sherbert's choice as coercive because it imposed "substantial
pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his
beliefs."' 0 Likewise, Thomas concluded that the choice between "fidelity
112. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981).
113. Id. at 716. The Court found that "[tihe narrow function of a reviewing court in this
context is to determine whether there was an appropriate finding that petitioner terminated his
work because of an honest conviction that such work was forbidden by his religion." Id.
114. The Court will accept an individual's interpretation of his religion provided that it is
not "bizarre" or "clearly nonreligious in motivation." Id. at 715.
115. Id.
116. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
117. 450 U.S. at 718. Even indirect compulsion is "substantial" infringement upon free ex-
ercise. For example, "[w]here the state conditions receipt of an important benefit upon con-
duct proscribed by a religious faith, or where it denies such a benefit because of conduct man-
dated by religious belief .... a burden upon religion exists." Id.
118. 374 U.S. at 404.
119. Id. at 403.
120. 450 U.S. at 717. The Court found that the choice between "fidelity to religious belief"
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to religious belief" and "cessation of work" had a "coercive impact" on
the petitioner "indistinguishable" from that placed on the petitioner in
Sherbert. 2'
The pressures found in Sherbert and Thomas are similar to those placed
on the war tax resister. The resister believes that killing is unjustified as a
matter of principle and that paying taxes in support of the military is no
less immoral than killing itself. Every time the conscientious objector pays
his federal income taxes he violates those beliefs. When he refuses to violate
his beliefs, the government seizes his goods or garnishes his wages to cover
the deficiency. Consequently, the tax resister ultimately is forced to support
war. In Sherbert and Thomas, the individuals involved were excluded from
benefits by virtue of their religious beliefs. The coercion to abandon
religious beliefs is greater in the case of the war tax resister than that of
Sherbert and Thomas. The believer is forced to support a program an-
tithetical to intensely held beliefs, or face possible imprisonment. 2 ' It is dif-
ficult to imagine a more substantial burden on the resister's right to free ex-
ercise.
The Government's Burden
The first step of the second part of the Brennan/Burger test requires an
assay of the governmental interest in taxation.'23 The court must decide
whether the tax serves a "compelling" interest or is of the "highest order"
in the hierarchy of public interests.
There are few governmental interests more important than the govern-
ment's interest in the collection of taxes. Every operation of government
depends, of course, upon revenues produced by taxation. The operations of
the government can easily survive, however, without the few dollars that
war tax resisters might withhold if courts were to sanction the resisters' first
amendment arguments.'" In the-context of tax resistance, however, the
and "cessation of work" had a "coercive impact" on the petitioner "indistinguishable" from
that placed on the petitioner in Sherbert. Id.
121. Id. at 718. This coercive element establishes a "burden" upon religion. Even where
"the compulsion . . . [is] indirect, the infringement upon free exercise is nonetheless substan-
tial." Id.
122. From 1941 to 1981, 16 persons were imprisoned for war tax resistance. GUIDE TO WAR
TAX RESISTANCE 72 (E. Hedemann ed. 1981).
123. The second step considers whether the means selected by the government to effect its
purpose are the least restrictive means available. See supra text accompanying notes 115-18.
124. The Act's sponsor, Sen. Hatfield, stated,
An estimated 0.5 to 9 percent of income taxpayers would use the World Peace
Tax Fund checkoff if it became law. This is based on the membership of the
Church of the Brethren, Mennonites and Quakers-Friends-who are the principal
supporters of WPTF, and have a combined membership of 540,000. A survey
taken at the time of the Calley sentence in 1971 by Harris indicated 9 percent
thought a soldier not justified in shooting an enemy in war, and is the only indica-
tion known of a poll of the public at large on conscientious objection.
125 CONG. REC. 7182 (1979) (statement of Sen. Hatfield).
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government is not as interested in the payment of all tax dollars as it is in
the payment of taxes by its citizens under some uniform system of assess-
ment. 25 As the Supreme Court recently has observed, a judicially created
exemption for religious objectors to military taxation obviously would skew
the uniformity that presently exists within the system. 2
6
As Professor Gianella has noted, there is a further problem beyond this
one of a uniform system of tax assessment and payment. That is, resisters'
opposing the use of their taxes for war purposes constitutes an attempt to
"subvert" democratic judgments. 127 One easily can imagine the fallout ef-
fect of the Court's sanction of war tax refusal. Pro-life resisters might
refuse those taxes representative of the government's abortion and popula-
tion control efforts while those against sex education in the public schools
might withhold taxes to protest such programs. These cases are less difficult
to imagine when one considers that courts already have had to restrain the
efforts of religiously motivated taxpayers who objected to the government's
wheat quota program 2a and similar efforts by those who objected to
government welfare programs.'2 9 Given the ferocity of the general tax
125. See Giannella, supra note 102, at 1409 (uniformity of treatment necessary for
distributive justice).
126. See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 259 (1982). In Lee, the appellee employer
claimed that the Amish religion's mandate to care for the elderly prevented him and his Amish
employees from conscientously participating in the social security system. The Court rejected
this argument, holding that the employer's religious beliefs did not exempt him from the provi-
sions of the Social Security Act that require employers to withhold social security taxes from
their employees' paychecks. In its reasoning the Court directly addressed the income tax ques-
tion:
Unlike the situation presented in Wisconsin v. Yoder . .. it would be difficult to
accommodate the comprehensive social security system with myriad exceptions
flowing from a wide variety of religious beliefs. The obligation to pay the social
security tax initially is not fundamentally different from the obligation to pay in-
come taxes; the difference-in theory at least-is that the social security tax
revenues are segregated for use only in furtherance of the statutory program. There
is no principled way, however, for purposes of this case, to distinguish between
general taxes and those imposed under the Social Security Act. If, for example, a
religious adherent believes war is a sin, and if a certain percentage of the federal
budget can be identified as devoted to war-related activities, such individuals would
have a similarly valid claim to be exempt from paying that percentage of the in-
come tax. The tax system could not function if denominations were allowed to
challenge the tax system because tax payments were spent in a manner that violates
their religious belief. (Citations omitted). Because the broad public interest in
maintaining a sound tax system is of such a high order, religious belief in conflict
with the payment of taxes affords no basis for resisting the tax.
Id. at __ , 102 S. Ct. at 1056 (emphasis added).
127. Giannella, supra note 102, at 1409.
128. See United States v. Kissinger, 250 F.2d 940 (3rd Cir.) (wheat quota program was
reasonable regulation to preserve econimic order and thus, does not violate free exercise
clause), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 958 (1958).
129. Crowe v. Commissioner, 396 F.2d 766 (8th Cir. 1968) (taxpayer cannot evade tax on
the basis that he does not approve of distribution of income).
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resistance of the 1980's, '3 a judicially sanctioned exemption might pave the
way for scores of both fraudulent and novel claims.
Unfortunately, the statutorily established' 3  and judicially interpreted 3 '
exemption from military service does not present an analogy from which
the religiously motivated tax resister can argue for a similar exemption
under the tax laws. The critical difference is that the military service exemp-
tion for conscientious objectors requires alternative service.'" Thus,
uniform treatment is preserved. There is no such official alternative for the
tax resister; therefore, resisters simply avoid the exaction of taxes. Though
some taxpayers attempt to pay that portion of their taxes representative of
the military's share to charitable agencies, courts have consistently disallowed
this practice as a tax substitute.' 3' Without some categorical, a priori
ratification of this procedure, administrative chaos would result. Thus,
there is a compelling governmental interest in maintaining a uniform system
of tax assessment and payment.
The second step of the second part of the balancing involves the con-
sideration of whether there is a less restrictive alternative to finance the
military effort than by forcing the religiously motivated to pay war taxes.
Resisters have argued that the World Peace Tax Fund Act is an appropriate
alternative."' Because Congress has not passed the Act, this argument
places the Court in the position of considering whether it should require the
executive branch of the government to offer the taxpayer an alternative that
is not yet codified. However, this posture is not novel to the Court. In the
past, the Court invalidated unreasonable regulatory schemes even though
less restrictive means had not yet been enacted.' 36 Nonetheless, it is unlikely
that the Court will find that the Act is a realistic alternative to the forced
130. Mitgang, IRS Receives More than 13,000 Tax Protests Yearly, Morgantown Dominion-
Post, Apr. 15, 1981, at 7A, col. 1. See also INSTITUTE FOR POLICY STUDIES, STATE AND LOCAL
TAX REVOLT (D. Tipps and L. Webb eds. 1980) (describing inequities of current property and
income tax schemes).
131. See Military Selective Service Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 4560) (1976).
132. See supra text accompanying notes 74-75.
133. 50 U.S.C. app. § 4560) (1976).
134. See, e.g., Lull v. Commissioner, 602 F.2d 1166 (4th Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (individual
taxpayers may not pay a portion of their tax liabilities to charitable agencies instead of the
government); Russell v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 942 (1973) (taxpayer cannot determine how
50% of her taxes will be expended).
135. See, e.g., Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 12-13, Graves v. Commissioner, 440 U.S.
946 (1979); Brief for Appellant at 25, Herby v. Commissioner, 602 F.2d 1166 (1979).
136. See, e.g., United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 267 (1967) (act that bars all Com-
munists from defense industries is overbroad; unnecessary for Court to consider alternative
means of preventing subversion); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487-90 (1960) (regulation
requiring all public school teachers to report all organizational ties was not the least drastic
means for achieving the state's legitimate purpose). See generally Note, The Less Restrictive
Alternative Principle in Constitutional Adjudication, 27 VAND. L. REV. 971 (1974) (Court
should suggest alternatives); Note, Less Drastic Means and the First Amendment, 78 YALE L.
J. 464 (1969) (Court's use of phrase is conclusory).
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payment of war taxes. If the Supreme Court found the Act to be such an
alternative, the Court would be in a weak position to deny the same treat-
ment to pro-life and other religiously motivated tax objectors. To collect
one hundred percent of the taxes owed by the resisters in each of these
categories, the Secretary of the Treasury would be forced to establish
separate formulas for each type of objector. For example, the war tax
resister would demand segregation from the general tax fund of the 49% of
his tax dollar that normally goes to war-related spending. Similarly, anti-
abortion tax objectors would demand that the .050o of their tax usually ear-
marked for family planning be withdrawn from the general tax fund. In
each instance, these monies would need to be funneled into an alternative
program the purpose of which the objector approved. The resultant com-
plexity would be an administrative nightmare.
Nonetheless, the seriousness of the issue to the resister and the conse-
quent burden on his free exercise rights might enable the Court to
distinguish war tax resistance from many other types of resistance.",
Spending for military purposes consumes a huge portion of the objector's
tax dollar. In contrast, spending for abortion and birth control consumes
only a miniscule portion of the pro-life taxpayer's dollar. This distinction,
however, is probably not sufficiently firm to rest an important constitu-
tional right upon. Indeed, to do so would put the Court at the pinnacle of a
very slippery slope. Such decisions are better left to Congress, which can
hear the political arguments on behalf of various resisters and make policy
judgments accordingly.
In short, Thomas supports the notion that the religiously motivated war
tax resister's beliefs reflect an honest conviction and are substantially
burdened by the government's exaction of taxes from him for the military
effort. Thus, the resister's case meets the first part of the Brennan/Burger
balancing test. The resister's case fails, however, at both stages of the test's
second step. First, there is a compelling public interest in uniform taxation
that is imperative to the functioning of government. Second, there is no
reasonable alternative to the forced exaction of taxes from the religious
resister's pockets that the Court will entertain. '38 The resister, therefore,
must look to legislative enactment of the WPTFA for relief.
137. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-18 (1972). A fundamental aspect of the Old
Order Amish religion in Yoder was the 300-year-old belief that members of the religion were to
be separated from the outside world. Thus, by exposing their children to "worldly" influences,
Wisconsin's enforcement of its compulsory secondary education statute gravely endangered the
practice of their religious faith. Id.
138. See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 259, (1982) (dictum). For a discussion of Lee,
see supra note 126. But see Comment, War Tax Refusal Under the Free Exercise Clause, 1980
Wis. L. REv. 753, 770-77 (suggesting that the less burdensome alternatives of "taxpayer
designation" under the WPTFA and lien and levy accompanied by civil penalties under the
current law are available).
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CAN THE ACT PASS CONSTITUTIONAL MUSTER?
The Constitution poses two problems for the World Peace Tax Fund Act.
The first concerns the doctrine of equal protection while the second involves
the difficulties of entanglement with religion.
Equal Protection
Under its traditional two-tiered analysis of equal protection problems, the
Supreme Court applies either a "strict scrutiny" or a "rational basis"
analysis.' 39 The Court applies strict scrutiny to any governmental action in-
volving an individual's "fundamental rights"."10 When such rights are at
stake, the Court inquires whether the means chosen are necessary to achieve
the "compelling" governmental interest."'
In the context of the WPTFA, the fundamental right at stake is the free
exercise of religion. The equal protection problem arises in that war tax ob-
jectors will be granted special treatment by the government under the
WPTFA while persons who maintain religious objections to other govern-
139. For a thorough review of the traditional two levels of judicial scrutiny, see P.
POLYViOU, THE EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS (1980). A possible new level of scrutiny was
posited by another commentator. Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Forward; In
Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for Newer Equal Protection, 86
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Gunther].
Over the past decade or so, the Court seems to have departed from the two-tiered analysis in
favor of a "sliding scale" or multi-tiered approach. Illustrative of this switch is the middle
level of scrutiny now given by the court to sex-based discrimination. See, e.g., Cabar v.
Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979) (invalidating New York law that allowed mother but not
father to block adoption by withholding consent because there was no showing that the dif-
ference in treatment bore a substantial relationship to the proclaimed state interest in pro-
moting adoption of illegitimates); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (Oklahoma statute
that required males to be age 21 to buy 3.2% beer while females could buy at age 18 in-
vidiously discriminated against males because the gender-based difference was not substantially
related to achievement of the statutory objective); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677
(1973) (statute that allowed male member of uniformed services to claim wife as dependent,
while female member required to show husband relied on her for over 1/2 of his support in
order to claim husband as a dependent, violated the equal protection clause in that it resulted
in dissimilar treatment of men and women similarly situated); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71
(1971) (provision of Idaho probate code giving preference to men over women for appoint-
ments as administrators violated the equal protection clause in that it provided dissimilar treat-
ment for men and women who were similarly situated). But see Sager, The Supreme Court,
1980 Term-Forward. Constitutional Limitations on Congress' Authority to Regulate the
Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17 (1981) (Court may have returned to
the old two-tier mode of analysis).
140. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (right to marry); Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618 (1969) (right of interstate migration); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383
U.S. 663 (1966) (right to vote); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (right to counsel in
a criminal case).
141. The Court requires such a close congruence between the governmental means and ends
that one scholar has observed that strict scrutiny usually invalidates the legislation. See Gun-
ther, supra note 139, at 19.
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ment spending purposes will not be afforded such treatment. Persons in this
latter category, therefore, can be expected to demand similar treatment.
Singling Out the Pacifist Taxpayer
There is no greater state interest than preserving and promoting the exer-
cise of a constitutional right. Although the war tax objector's first amend-
ment free exercise rights do not support a judicially created exemption from
taxation,'"2 those rights do make an appropriate subject for legislative ac-
tion designed to relieve the war tax objector of a serious burden on his con-
science. One need look no further for precedent than the special statutory
treatment given particular religious sects under the Social Security Act.' 3
Such accommodations of constitutional values by the legislature constitute
perhaps a paramount interest of a democratic government.'"" Yet, despite
this good reason for assisting the war tax objector in preserving his religious
convictions, does the equal protection doctrine compel similar assistance to
other types of objectors?
There are a number of reasons why the equal protection doctrine does
not require assistance to all categories of objectors, the most important of
which is the prevention of government entanglement with religion in viola-
tion of the establishment clause.'4 5 The category of taxpayers who object to
"all wars" is a centuries-old, well-defined classification.' 6  Conscientious
142. See supra notes 120-33 and accompanying text.
143. See I.R.C. § 1402(g) (1965) (originally numbered as § 1402 (h)(1)). Section 1402(g) pro-
vides, in pertinent part:
(1) Exemptions.-Any individual may file an application . . . for an exemption
from the tax imposed by this chapter if he is a member of a recognized religious
sect or division thereof and is an adherent of established tenets or teachings of
such sect or division by reason of which he is conscientiously opposed to accep-
tance of the benefits of any private or public insurance which makes payments in
the event of death, disability, old-age, or retirement or makes payments toward the
cost of, or provides services for, medical care (including the benefits of any in-
surance system established by the Social Security Act).
The policy behind this exemption was stated as follows:
The ... problem of the conflict between the government's desire to operate an ef-
ficient and orderly social security system and a religious interest forbidding the
aiding of society through life insurance was solved by the enactment of [this] sec-
tion. . . . This section was enacted in response to appeals from members of
religious groups who objected to the tax imposed by the Social Security Act....
Congress has limited the exemption by defining standards.
Id. See also Comment, First Amendment Rights and Exemption from the Withholding Tax: A
Critical Look at American Friends Service Committee v. United States, 60 IowA L. REV. 174,
188-89 (1974) (legislative exemptions preferable to judicial exemptions).
144. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 819-32 (1978) (accommodation
to religious values is preferred in first amendment jurisprudence) [hereinafter cited as TRIBE].
145. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (establishment clause is violated
by excessive entanglement of government with religion).
146. See supra notes 74-75, 131 and accompanying text.
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objectors to war, because of their historic relationship to the Selective Ser-
vice System' 7 and because of the existence of a body of judicially defined
standards for defining conscientious objection to war,' 8 constitute a group
that is much more identifiable than other protest groups. The WPTFA
takes advantage of this feature of war tax resisters by adopting the Selective
Service System's standards for objectors. 49 Although the war tax resister's
objection to "all wars" is clearly definable as religious in nature, and
therefore cloaked with free exercise, other groups of objectors are not
categorized as easily. Unlike war resisters, no historical definition is
available for those groups who object to contraception, abortion, welfare
benefits, agricultural subsidies or limitations, public works, public educa-
tion, or taxpaying itself. Thus, separating the legitimate religious objectors
from the multitude of other objectors may place the government in the
same entangling evaluation process that was viewed as an establishment
clause danger in Walz v. Tax Commission. 5 '
Beyond the dangers of entanglement, however, there are other
distinguishing factors between war tax objectors and other religious objec-
tors. Perhaps the most significant distinction is that the war tax resister is
more adversely affected because of the amount in the federal budget
devoted to the military effort. The current federal administration plans to
increase military spending to over one and one-half trillion dollars for the
next five years.' The 1982 budget alone will consume more than 221
billion tax dollars for military spending.' 52 In percentages, the military
claims approximately 25-50% of every income tax dollar.' These figures
147. Recognizing the fact that spirited and articulate pacifists inevitably will challenge the
organized draft, Congress consistently has provided conscientious objector status to enable
qualified persons "to refuse to comply with the law while complying with it." See Comment,
Conscientious Objection and the First Amendment, 14 AKRON L. REV. 71, 72 (1980). The
Supreme Court has justified this draft exemption, saying "that liberty of conscience has a
moral and social value which makes it worthy of preservation at the hands of the state."
United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 170 (1965).
148. See, e.g., Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 342-43 (1970) (to qualify for conscien-
tious objector status, sincerity of belief in Supreme Being must be based upon "moral, ethical
or religious principles" and objection to war cannot be grounded in considerations of "policy,
pragmatism or expediency"); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965) (in construing
the meaning of the term "Supreme Being" under § 6() of the Draft Act of 1864, the Court
established this test: "A sincere and meaningful belief which occupies in the life of its
possessor a place parallel to that filled by the God of those admittedly qualifying for the ex-
emption comes within the statutory definition").
149. S. 880, supra note 4, at § 3.
150. 397 U.S. 664 (1970). Walz held that the government's determination of which religion
merits tax exemption would involve excessive entanglement. Id. at 674.
151. See Washington Post, Apr. 3, 1981, at A7, col. 4.
152. See N.Y. Times, June 21, 1981, at E4, col. 3. The Reagan administration plans to in-
crease military spending to $343 billion by 1986. N.Y. Times, May 31, 1981, at F3, col. I.
153. The New York Times estimates that military spending consumes 280o of the federal
budget, N.Y. Times, June 18, 1980, at A16, col. I. Others estimate military spending, in-
cluding past military costs, to be near 50%. NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR A WORLD PEACE TAX
FUND, SWORDS INTO PLOWSHARES (pamphlet, 1979).
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form the basis for the war tax resister's serious concerns. Because one of
every two of his tax dollars is spent for purposes he considers immoral,
compliance with the tax code seriously violates his beliefs. There is no fiscal
comparison between the war tax objector and objectors to abortion or
agricultural subsidies. Both in absolute dollars and in the percentages of the
total budget, spending in these other areas is dwarfed by spending for the
military effort. The burden on the war tax resister's conscience, therefore,
is the most serious of conscientious tax objections.
Finally, the administrative inconvenience of a plethora of permissive tax
exemptions would be substantial. The Treasury not only would be required
to discriminate among claims in its search for those that are legitimate, but
it also would be forced to establish and administer hundreds of separate
trust funds for comparatively small amounts of money."' In short, there
are compelling state interests for limiting, at least for the present, tax relief
only to those conscientiously opposed to war.
The Establishment Clause
The establishment clause poses the second constitutional problem for the
WPTFA. The tripartite analysis for testing the validity of a government ac-
tion under the establishment clause asks whether the action has a secular
purpose, whether it has a secular effect, and whether it would result in ex-
cessive government entanglement with religion."
As recognized by the Supreme Court, the analysis of secular purpose
creates an overlay with the analysis required under the equal protection
clause.' 5 In this instance, the purpose of the WPTFA is identical to the
compelling interest underlying its enactment, namely the accommodation of
legitimate religious conscientious objection under the free exercise clause of
the first amendment.' In the Court's words, "it is hardly impermissible
for Congress to attempt to accommodate free exercise values . . . ."' In
so doing, Congress does not put its imprimatur on an "extraneous
theological viewpoint,"15 9 nor does it attempt a "religious gerrymander"160
154. This is a danger that is already well recognized. See Nat'l Cath. Rep., July 3, 1981, at
23, col. 1.
155. See Roemer v. Maryland Public Works Bd., 426 U.S. 736, 748 (1976) (Maryland
statute authorizing subsidies to private schools upheld); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,
612-14 (1971) (Rhode Island statute granting aid to private schools unconstitutional under three
precedential tests). See also Bastress, supra note 102, at 307-15 (explaining three-part establish-
ment clause analysis).
156. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 449 n.14 (1971) (Section 60) of the Military
Selective Service Act is neutral and not violative of establishment clause, thus, "it follows"
that equal protection principles are not contravened); Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664,
696 (1970) (inherent in the neutrality analysis of an establishment clause claim is "an equal
protection mode of analysis").
157. See supra text accompanying notes 127-30.
158. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 453 (1971).
159. Id. at 454.
160. Id. at 452 (quoting Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 696 (1970) (Harlan, J.,
concurring)).
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of the law to favor particular religious organizations. Instead, Congress ex-
pands the range within which one may be true to his conscience regardless
of "sectarian affiliation." ' 6'
Neutral, secular purposes exist for limiting special treatment to war ob-
jectors as opposed to other types of conscientious objectors. With the ex-
ception of the government's war-making power, there is probably no
governmental function more vital to its existence than the revenue-raising
function. Providing special tax fund treatment to anyone who objects on
religious grounds to any government spending program not only would un-
constitutionally entangle the government with evaluating religious claims,
but would hinder the government's ability to budget and spend tax dollars
in a predictable manner. Rather, special tax treatment should be limited to
war objectors because of their centuries-long resistance to payment of war
taxes. Moreover, special tax treatment, without limitations, for anyone who
desired it would begin to jeopardize the validity of democratic decisions. '62
Moreover, the WPTFA will have primarily a secular and neutral effect.
The primary impact of the Act will be to allow persons of conscience to act
in accordance with their scruples, an impact already identified by the
Supreme Court as secular and neutral.'63 Furthermore, no particular
religious organization will benefit from the WPTFA because opposition to
war taxation is found in virtually every sectarian affiliation. Thus, the Act
is not an instance in which the government is using its power "to bring
religion into the lives of its citizens. 164
A secondary secular effect of the Act will be to eliminate much of the
unlawful tax resistance that presently occurs in response to the Internal
Revenue Service's efforts to collect taxes from war resisters. The elimina-
tion of such resistance will reduce administrative costs and smooth the flow
of tax dollars to the Treasury. Indeed, the Act also might have a slight ef-
fect in increasing revenues because some war tax objectors now voluntarily
reduce their earned income below taxable amounts.'6 5 The implementation
of the WPTFA would encourage these people to earn taxable incomes.
The last phase of the establishment clause inquiry requires a determina-
tion of whether the Act results in government entanglement with religion.
Most of the Supreme Court cases that have dealt with the entanglement test
have discussed the necessity of monitoring various teaching-related activities
161. 401 U.S. at 454.
162. See Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 458-60 (1971). Gillette upheld § 60) of the
Military Selective Service Act, which permitted conscientious objector exemptions only to those
opposed to all wars. In so holding, Gillette concluded that exempting selective objectors would
jeopardize the binding quality of democratic decisions. Id. at 459. Gillette reasoned that op-
position to a particular war depends upon particularistic factual beliefs and policy that
presumably were weighed and overridden by the government that decided to commit lives and
resources to war. Id.
163. Id. at 453.
164. Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 696 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
165. See TAX DILEMMA, supra note 3, at 58-59.
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within parochial schools.'" Of course, no such surveillance would be in-
volved with the administration of the WPTFA.
Evaluating the validity of an objector's claim, one source of ad-
ministrative entanglement,' 67 is minimized by two aspects of the proposed
Act. One requirement is that the taxpayer render the full amount of the
taxes he or she owes;' 8 thus, there is no apparent incentive, at least in
financial terms, for a taxpayer to falsely claim objector status. A second
related aspect allows the taxpayer, not the government, to make the first
determination of his status.' 9 This self-selecting system is sensible in light
of the lack of financial incentive to deceive the government and it also re-
quires much less administrative involvement than does the Selective Service
Act. 7 ' Under that Act, Selective Service boards first determine whether one
qualifies as a conscientious objector.' 7 ' In contrast, the proposed Act's self-
selecting system with no initial governmental involvement provides very lit-
tle potential or incentive for the government to become administratively en-
tangled with religion in the operation of the program.'72 The government
only becomes involved in the WPTFA evaluation process when the
Secretary has reason to ask for additional verifying information.'73 If the
Secretary remains unconvinced, he must go to a United States District
Court for a declaratory judgment on the issue.' 7
Finally, it is obvious that political entanglement of the type recognized by
the Supreme Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman,'7 ' is not a potential problem
166. See Roemer v. Maryland Public Works Bd., 426 U.S. 736 (1976) (considering entangle-
ment problem of Maryland statute granting aid to parochial schools); Hunt v. McNair, 413
U.S. 734 (1973) (reviewing entanglement of South Carolina statute aiding higher educational
institutions in constructing facilities). See also Bastress, supra note 102, at 311 (decisions in en-
tanglement cases usually involve parochial schools).
167. Entanglement generally is viewed as being either political or administrative in nature.
See Committee for Public Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 794-98 (1973) (distinguishing be-
tween specific state administrative involvement with religious programs and broader sense of
political involvement); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 615-20, 622-24 (1971) (assessing ad-
ministrative entanglement fostered by Rhode Island statute as distinct from the broader poten-
tial for political entanglement). See also TRIBE, supra note 144, at 866 (entanglement analyzed
as two distinct notions: political and administrative).
168. S. 880, supra note 4, at § 3(a) (amending I.R.C. § 6099(b)(1)(C)(2)).
169. Id. at § 3(a) (amending I.R.C. § 6099(b)(1)(A)).
170. Military Selective Service Act, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 451-73 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
171. The Selective Service Act requires that the objector's claim be "sustained by the
Board." Id. at § 4560); Becker v. Hershey, 309 F. Supp. 487, 489 (D. Conn. 1969).
172. But cf. New York v. Cathedral Academy, 434 U.S. 125, 133 (1977) (litigation by
church and state over religious meaning violates constitutional guarantee against establishment
of religion); Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969) (first amendment for-
bids courts from interpreting particular church doctrines and the importance of these doctrines
to the religion).
173. S. 880, supra note 4, at § 3(a) (amending I.R.C. § 6099(b)(l)(B)).
174. Id. at § 3(a) (amending I.R.C. § 6099(b)(1)(C)).
175. 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (state funds provided to financially ailing religious schools for pur-
poses of supplementing teacher salaries for secular instruction held violative of establishment
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here. In Lemon, the Court feared that allocation of aid between private and
public schools would divide the legislature along religious lines. The Act
will not cause clear divisions among religions that lead persons to take posi-
tions based on sectarian beliefs.
In sum, the WPTFA poses no establishment clause danger when analyzed
under the three-pronged test for examining the validity of government ac-
tions. The proposed Act is secular both in purpose and effect and poses no
threat of excessive entanglement with religion.
WOULD PASSAGE OF THE ACT BE IN THE INTERESTS OF THE
CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR? OF THE NATION?
In light of the failure of the resister's free exercise arguments, 7 6 there ap-
pears to be no resolution of his dilemma other than the congressional enact-
ment of the World Peace Tax Fund Act. There is, however, a serious ques-
tion of whether the Act actually will advance, or instead, retard the
resister's cause. A review of the effects of enactment from the resister's
view, as well as from the perspective of the population in general, is
necessary to answer this question.
Passage of the Act would give legal rights to a beleaguered minority.
Since the first resistance of the colonial Quakers, war tax resisters have been
forced to live outside of the law to follow the dictates of their consciences.
Although the courts cannot employ the free exercise clause to liberate
resisters from what resisters perceive as an oppressive scheme, Congress can
legislate a solution that takes the resister out of bondage without giving him
a financial windfall. The conscientious objector's centuries-old history of
patient suffering demands this legislative recognition and relief. "
Congressional enactment of qualified exemptions for taxpayers conscien-
tiously opposed to war would be consistent with this country's traditional
emphasis on freedom of conscience. The significance of this freedom to the
founding fathers is evident from the wording of the original religion amend-
ment to the Constitution: "Congress shall make no law establishing
religion, or to prevent the free exercise thereof, or to infringe the rights of
conscience."' 7 8 Moreover, Congress has recognized the right to freedom of
clause because the state would need to monitor continuously state funds to ensure that they
were being used solely for secular purposes).
176. See supra notes 40-49, 86-87 and accompanying text.
177. As one of the Act's sponsors remarked:
[O]ur present tax system is working a grievous injustice against people who, while
not required to bear arms, must still pay for others to do so and for the continuing
and widening arms race. Requiring taxes for current military outlay from people
whose moral and spiritual background and framework forbid them participation in
violent means of conflict resolution is a dark blot upon our human rights policy.
125 CONG. REC. 7181-82 (1979) (statement of Sen. Hatfield).
178. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 766 (1834). See Freeman, A Remonstrance for Conscience, 106 U.
PA. L. REV. 806, 812 (1958).
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conscience in every war since the Civil War by providing for conscientious
objector exemptions to military service."7 9 In United States v. Seeger," the
Supreme Court, quoting Harlan Fiske Stone, acknowledged the preferred
place of conscience in relation to the state.
[Bloth morals and sound policy require that the state should not violate
the conscience of the individual. All our history gives confirmation to the
view that liberty of conscience has a moral and social value which makes
it worthy of preservation at the hands of the state. So deep in its
significance and vital, indeed, is it to the integrity of man's moral and
spiritual nature that nothing short of the self-preservation of the state
should warrant its violation; and it may well be questioned whether the
state which preserves its life by a settled policy of violation of the conscience
of the individual will not in fact ultimately lose it by the process."'
Thus, there is both inherent and practical value in adopting the Act: in-
herent in that this country's founding principles would be served by freeing
resisters to act within the law; practical in that the state's best defense
against dissent is to allow it.
Beyond these values, enactment of the WPTFA also would promote the
cause of peace in a number of ways. First, if a significant portion of
American taxpayers vote with their dollars against war, Congress may re-
spond by moving toward a federal budget that is less devoted to military
spending. Second, public awareness of the issues of war and peace will in-
crease because each federal taxpayer will be forced to assess his objector
status when filling out the federal tax form."' Finally, the cause of peace
might be aided further if tax dollars that otherwise would be spent on the
military were invested in peace research, such as that proposed by the Act.
Although difficult to imagine, by adoption of the Act a state of peace
might become more of a reality.
Critics of the Act might contend that resisters are misleading themselves
by advocating its enactment. The Act requires the government to place that
portion of the resister's taxes that represent the percentage of the federal
budget devoted to non-military spending in the general fund on the condi-
tion that "no part of the money transferred . . . shall be appropriated for
any expenditures, or otherwise obligated, for military purposes."", As the
179. See Selective Service and Training Act of 1940, ch. 720, § 5(g), 54 Stat. 885, 889
(1940); The Draft Act of 1917, ch. 15, § 4, 40 Stat. 76, 78 (1917); The Draft Act of 1864, ch.
13, § 17, 13 Stat. 6, 9 (1864). Prior to the Civil War the states exempted objectors from service
on religious grounds. See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 170 (1965).
180. 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
181. Id. at 170 (quoting Stone, The Conscientious Objector, 21 COLUM. U.Q. 253, 269
(1919)).
182. See S. 880, supra note 4, at § 3(a) (amending I.R.C. § 6099(a)). Each tax form will
have a provision, much like the $1 presidential election campaign contribution check-off,
which will force the taxpayer to claim or disclaim conscientious objector status. As a result,
public awareness of the issues of peace and war inevitably will increase.
183. Id. at § 6(a).
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cynic would point out, the resister has no guarantee that his tax dollars ac-
tually will be segregated from the billions of dollars in the general fund
each year. Accordingly, the Act is simply a formal, paper technicality
designed for people who naively think the Treasury deals in bags of money.
Thus, it is useful only for assuaging the conscience of the resister without
actually assuring that only non-military purposes are served by the resister's
dollars.
Perhaps the most serious criticism of the Act is that, in reality, it is
designed for political, not religious, ends. The Act, it is argued, does not
really affect spending, for there are no "bags of money" being moved
about. Rather, it is only a barometer of political opinion regarding the
country's military posture at any point in time. Objectors' desire to direct
their tax dollars toward peace goals can represent a political position on the
nation's military posture, and thus, serve group political goals rather than
simply individual religious values.
As far as the citizen-pacifist is concerned, however, the most serious ill
effect of the Act is that it might work too well. For centuries, the tax
resister has been called to be a prophetic witness to peace. His refusal to
"do business as usual"'"" has forced his fellow citizens to reflect upon the
correctness of their conduct. Institutionalizing conscientious objection to
taxation by way of the Act might result in the extinction of the tax resister
as a moral beacon. The community of citizens will lose a public standard by
which it might judge its conduct. With resisters officially appeased, the
issues they have traditionally raised by their civil disobedience will be more
easily swept aside.
It is not difficult to resolve this conflict between the costs and benefits of
the Act in favor of passage of the Act. The cynic's objection that no money
will actually be segregated and diverted from military purposes can be met
with the aid of the equity courts and the watchful eye of the private citizen.
A citizen-suit provision, if added to the proposed Act, would further lessen
the fear of government non-compliance." '
The argument that the Fund would support political ends unrelated to the
problems of individual conscience is a more substantial argument. Never-
theless, it is important to remember that to prevent the conscientious objec-
tor from benefitting from a windfall tax rate, he must continue to be taxed
at one hundred percent of liability. Since a sizeable portion of this one hun-
dred percent cannot be devoted to military spending, other uses must be
determined. If the government were to put these taxes toward non-military
spending, then the tax burden on non-objectors would be lessened in this
area, freeing those dollars for military spending. That result is hardly con-
sistent with the thrust of the Act. Thus, there seems to be no other choice
than to find projects outside the normal governmental sphere for funding.
184. D. BERRIGAN, No BARS TO MANHOOD 165 (1970).
185. An analogous citizen-suit provision is contained in the Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 1270 (Supp. IV 1980).
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Although this alternative is novel because it involves using tax money for
non-traditional governmental purposes, it is difficult to imagine any serious
objection to devoting relatively small amounts of money toward the pursuit
of peace.
The danger of assimilating the resister into the mainstream, so that society
loses sight of the moral alternative to war he offers, is no danger at all. In-
stead, the resister will simply find new and more creative methods to pro-
mote his case for peace in the public mind. In this decade objectors have
already been at work, using a variety of schemes outside the tax-resistance
field, to protest the power of the Pentagon, the danger of nuclear war, and
over-militarization in general.' 8 6
CONCLUSION
No court has ever granted constitutional protection to taxpayers who
have conscientiously resisted the payment of war taxes. The judiciary
realizes that our uniform system of taxation, in which the government has a
compelling interest, would not survive long if courts accorded resisters
special tax treatment. Therefore, if relief is to be afforded the long-
suffering conscientiously objecting taxpayer, it must come from the political
and legislative process.
The World Peace Tax Fund Act would be an appropriate congressional
response to the resister's plight. From a practical perspective, it works to
eliminate the objector's scruples without excusing him from the obligation
to pay his full share of taxes. From a constitutional point of view, the
secular and neutral effect of the Act would allow its implementation
without excessive entanglement between church and state.
Finally, an important potential benefit of enacting the WPTFA should
not be overlooked. Given the intensity with which resisters hold their
beliefs, it is certain that without the WPTFA, resisters will continue to say
"no" to war by withholding taxes. Thus, they will still suffer the seizure of
their goods, civil fines, and criminal penalties. To effect their spiritual mis-
sion, resisters do not need the Act. Yet to reach a plane where religious
freedoms are honored in deed as well as in constitutional word, society
does.
186. The most vivid of such schemes is the action of the "Plowshares Eight" a group of
resisters including Phillip Berrigan and Daniel Berrigan, that disobeyed property laws by taking
hammers to missile nose cones being built for the military by the General Electric Company.
The eight disobedients were convicted of burglary, criminal mischief, and criminal conspiracy
on March 6, 1981, by a Pennsylvania trial court. N.Y. Times, March 7, 1981, at 9, col. 2.
Their case is now on appeal. Commonwealth v. Berrigan, No. 81-1959 (Pa. Super. Ct., July
28, 1981).
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